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ESSAY
WHAT'S GONE WRONG WITH LEGAL THEORY?: THE
THREE FACES OF OUR SPLIT PERSONALITY
R. George Wright*
What has gone wrong with legal theory? Professor R. George
Wright answers that question by explaining the "split" that has
occurred in most works of legal theory. Three forms of these
"dualisms" have appeared in various works, and Wright shows
through example how unworkable they are. The three forms of
this split legal personality show an inclination to reject any
claims of objectivity in legal thought. Wright claims that as a
result, a heavy price is paid by certain groups in society.
"It's hard to explain our Heckle and Jeckle performance. XI
Mark Jackson
INTRODUCTION
These days, most serious works of legal theory express, in one
way or another, a splitting of the legal personality. Sometimes, the
splitting or ambivalence is conscious. Consider, for example, some
of the concluding thoughts from a recent book by Louis Michael
Seidman and Mark Tushnet:
What is ultimately required is a kind of dual consciousness....
Constitutionalists cannot simply forget their hard-won
knowledge of the emptiness of constitutional arguments. Yet
: Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University.
Gratitude is hereby expressed, for their counsel, to Debby Denno, Michael
Perry, Steve Smith, Mark Tushnet, and Lloyd Weinreb.
1. Quoted in Shaun Powell, Last Stand for Knick Duo?, MIAMI HERALD,
Dec. 11, 1990, at 2D.
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they must act as if the arguments were not empty if they are
to energize our politics and give meaning and purpose to our
public lives. They must somehow authentically admire the
emperor's new clothes, all the while knowing on a different
level of consciousness that he is most assuredly naked.2
Seidman and Tushnet are hardly alone in this sort of deep ambiva-
lence about our legal system.3 The project of this essay is to put
some structure on the awkward dualisms at the heart of contempo-
rary legal theory, and to suggest a remedy.
As it happens, these dualisms, amounting to a split legal per-
sonality,4 take three separate forms. Let us briefly consider the
three forms in the abstract, and then move to the level of concrete
example. The first form of awkward legal dualism involves our in-
venting an unworkable distinction, or grossly exaggerating a real
2. Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF:
CoNTEPoRARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 200 (1996).
3. In his recent book, Professor Steve Smith concludes that classical ideas
such as that of respect for persons or human flourishing are ultimately empty,
while still feeling the enormous gravitational pull of these ideas. See STEVEN D.
SITH, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PRIDE OF REASON (1998). Consider Duncan
Kennedy's recent characterization of "American critical legalism" as "an odd
combination of utter faith and utter distrust in law." DUNCAN KENNEDY, A
CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 73 (1997). Peter de Marneffe raises the possibility
"that the conscientious use of legal theories is likely to lead judges to incorrect
decisions." Peter de Marneffe, But Does Theory Lead to Better Legal Decisions?:
Response to Ronald Dworkin's In Praise of Theory, 29 ARIz. ST. L.J. 427, 427
(1997). Ronald Dworkin notes that theory, at least in his narrow sense of the
term, "seems abstract, metaphysical, and wholly out of place when there is real
work to be done," yet theory is inevitable and indispensable in deciding cases.
Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, 29 ARIz. ST. L.J. 353, 354-55 (1997). For
purposes of this paper, we will not assume all legal theory to be so abstract,
general, unempirical, and unconcerned about legal and social institutional is-
sues as to limit its own usefulness. See also J.M. Balldn & Sanford Levinson,
Constitutional Grammar, 72 TEx. L. REV. 1771, 1785 (1994) (criticizing Profes-
sor Philip Bobbitt as attempting unsatisfactorily to distinguish "natural law"
from the "ethical" in judging); Philip Bobbitt, The Third Man, 63 U. COLO. L.
REv. 415, 415 (1992) (opining that Professor Sanford Levinson is simultane-
ously "captivated by the notion of the theoretical" and "skeptical of theory as a
guide for action"); Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1738 (1995) (discussing both the advantages and disadvan-
tages of judicial resort to generalized theories); Dennis Patterson, Conscience
and the Constitution, 93 COLu . L. REv. 270, 293 (1993) (reviewing PHILIP
BoBBrIT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991)) ("Twentieth century philoso-
phy discredits many of the epistemological assumptions of natural law and
positivism, of formalism and realism, but it does not replace those
schools .... ).
4. Our choice of terminology is undeterred by the fact that Stedman's
Medical Dictionary makes no reference to a "split" personality. Stedman's does
refer to dual personality as well as to multiple personality, but on the under-
standing that none of the alternate identities is consciously aware of the exis-
tence of the others. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1172-73 (25th ed. 1990).
In many instances, modern legal theorists are keenly aware of the awkward
"splits" in their thinking.
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distinction. Here, we are consciously aware that we are using both
sides of a distinction. We may not, however, recognize its unwork-
ability or its exaggerated character. The deep explanation for this
sort of untenable dualism lies in our wish to retain both of two
highly desired but conflicting values. The invented or exaggerated
dualism allows us for a time to avoid admitting the tradeoff between
those two conflicting values, or to avoid having to find other ways of
reconciling those values.
The second form of legal dualism does not involve consciously
using both sides of a distinction at the same time. The second du-
alism instead takes the form of focusing on one or more ideas and
defining them narrowly or nonstandardly, but in a way that still
trades upon the power and rhetorical force of broader, more stan-
dard definitions of the same terms. There is thus a conscious desire
to disavow, and perhaps an unconscious desire to continue to rely
upon, traditional meanings and associations of one's newly rede-
fined legal terminology. One both does, and does not, entirely give
up the standard meanings of one's terminology.
The third form of legal dualism, finally, involves a complete
abandonment to dualism. Dualism here is assumed to be an ulti-
mate and unimprovable state of affairs. It amounts to what is often
called relativism. No moral or legal value can transcend the per-
spective of any particular group. Thus, there may be as many ulti-
mate moral or legal schemes as there are group perspectives. Here,
the split legal personality simply divides into two or more separate
personalities. The two separate personalities, now embodied in
separate groups, may interact and affect each other. They may or
may not find some degree of common ground. No group or person
involved may accept the label of relativism, but relativism in a
broad sense describes the situation.
It is not hard to think of important examples of each of these
three forms of the split legal personality. Take the first form of le-
gal dualism above, that of "exaggerated distinction" dualism. Parts
I and II below work through an example that has long been crucial
to moral philosophers, but which should also be recognized as ut-
terly central to the work of many modem legal theorists as well. In
particular, we will explore the legal use of a distinction commonly
but uninformatively known as that between the right and the good.
This distinction argues for a significant moral or legal difference be-
tween two sets of abstract ideas. One set includes the idea of the
right in the sense of acting rightly. This set also includes the ideas
of duty, obligation, ought-to-do, and, crucially, the idea of justice.
The other set includes ideas such as the good, including the good
life, the valued and the valuable, human flourishing, human fulfill-
ment, the idea of what ought-to-be, and interests and purposes in
general.
As we shall see in Parts I and II, many writers have invested
heavily in this distinction, which for the sake of tradition and con-
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venience, though certainly not clarity, we must continue to refer to
as that between the right and the good. It has been common for
philosophers and, increasingly, legal theorists to exaggerate and
crucially rely on this distinction. Writers have competed, and con-
tinue to compete, to show that either the right or the good is "prior
to" or more basic than the other, and to found their approach to law
or morality on such a supposed priority. Either the right is depend-
ent upon and defined in terms of the good, or vice versa.
Of late, it has also become popular to try to argue as well that
the right is somehow more "objective," and the good more"subjective." Whatever their priority, it is commonly thought that
the good is more subjective than the right. By this is meant,
roughly, that questions of the right and of justice, as opposed to the
good, may have answers that are more "real," somehow more natu-
rally inescapable, and less dependent upon the moral evaluator's
own preferences as to how the moral inquiry should come out. In
contrast, it is thought, questions of the good life or of human inter-
ests have answers that are less "real," and more dependent upon ul-
timately arbitrary preferences, tastes, or group membership. Thus,
on this view it is thought, for example, that the good life for each
person is largely a matter of the individual's own preference or dis-
cretion. The right, perhaps in the form of what social justice re-
quires, is in contrast thought to be less a matter of such subjective
discretion.
The payoff for drawing this distinction, it is supposed, is that
we can then have the best of both objectivism and subjectivism.
Certain horrifying behaviors can be legally and morally ruled out as
"really" or objectively wrong, but most, if not all, legal paternalism
on the basis of lifestyle and choice of the good life can be blocked on
the theory that the good is subjective.
This indeed sounds splendid. To sum up the results of Part I
and especially Part II, however, none of this works, at any stage. If
we want, as we should, to block government paternalism in the
realm of the good life, we can and must find other ways. In par-
ticular, we can summon the courage to say that a rich variety of
ways of living, depending upon individual choice, is objectively justi-
fied and required by justice itself.
Part III takes up the second form of legal dualism, in which the
legal theorist consistently endorses unusually narrow understand-
ings of crucial legal and moral terms, while unconsciously drawing
upon or benefiting from the long established, more ambitious,
broader understandings he repudiates. This Part focuses in par-
ticular on the important recent work on euthanasia, assisted sui-
cide, and the idea of objectivity itself by the preeminent legal theo-
rist Ronald Dworkin. We shall see that Professor Dworkin is
perfectly consistent in how he chooses to define key terms, and in
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the political or constitutional results he reaches.5 But this sort of
consistency is no guarantee of a deeper single-mindedness. If the
Prince of Denmark had published his thoughts, he might have writ-
ten that he intended the death of his step-father. This, however,
would not reflect a deeper single-mindedness in Hamlet.6 Professor
Dworkin can consistently reject standard meanings of familiar
terms, but there is no easy way to also reject the rich historical as-
sociations of those familiar terms as well. Certain associations of
familiar moral and legal terms are inevitable. These associations-
whether Dworkin repudiates them or not-inevitably add to the ap-
parent gravity, power, and rhetorical force of his legal argument.
Part IV addresses the third and final form of legal dualism, in
which subjectivism of value takes the form of an irreducible group
relativism. Here, the split in the legal personality becomes a full
separation and divorce. Group relativism as to moral and legal
matters today clearly exerts a powerful attraction. We shall see,
however, that at least in the important context of the law and mo-
rality of rape, the collective split personality of group relativism is
largely without appeal. A world in which many men think one set
of thoughts about the scope and morality of date rape and many
women think another is far from ideal. If the beliefs of these men
and women about date rape are thought to be merely different, and
not also genuinely better and worse, women will inevitably wind up
paying a large and unnecessary price. A civilized society should be
able to justifiedly condemn date rape, broadly understood, and not
merely report that many women, as opposed to many men, oppose
date rape solely from a group-based perspective.
Putting our treatments of the three forms of the split legal per-
sonality together, a consistent, unifying theme emerges. This is
that the popular inclination not merely to be suspicious of claims to
objectivity, but to reject even the aspiration to objectivity itself,
turns out to be unattractive. We can and should uphold our most
noble legal ideals because they are genuinely noble, and not merely
because they happen to be ours. There are certainly costs and risks
in our continuing to seek genuinely, objectively better principles in
law and morality. But we are likely to be worse off if we emphasize
subjectivism in any of the ways built into the three forms of legal
dualism introduced above. In reality, much of the price of rejecting
the ideal of objectivity is paid by groups without much social power.
5. For a discussion of Porfessor Dworkin and his ideas, see infra note 81
and accompanying text.
6. As observed in the title chosen by a fellow Dane, SOREN KIERKEGAARD,
PURITY OF HEART IS TO WILL ONE THING (Douglas V. Steere trans., Harper &
Bros. 1948) (1847). Recall as well the quite unnecessary prefatory language in-
troducing Olivier's movie version of Hamlet: "This is the story of a man who
could not make up his mind." HAMLET (Paramount 1948).
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The popular suspicion of the goal of objectivity is generally not in
the interests of the disadvantaged and oppressed.
I. SPLITTING THE LEGAL PERSONALITY: THE RIGHT
AND THE GOOD FOR LEGAL PURPOSES
Judges, lawyers, and even most legal academics do not often
rely explicitly on a literal distinction between the right and the
good. Of course, the idea of doing the right thing plays a central
role in our legal system.' Our broadly liberal legal system may
seem more interested in rights in the sense of, say, First Amend-
ment claims than in "right" in the sense of the legally required thing
to do. On the other hand, we may want legal actors, such as judges,
to aim for right answers when they are available,8 even though we
do not expect a broadly liberal legal regime to focus intensely on
what it is right or wrong for private parties to do.9
In the relevant sense, that of doing the legally right thing, the
right is legally crucial. In the sense with which we are concerned,
the right is linked with what is just, or with what justice requires.
Surely it would be odd to say that our legal system ought take no
thought for justice. In our sense, the right is closely linked with jus-
tice, with doing one's duty or fulfilling one's obligations, and with
what one ought to do.'0 To say that the right is unimportant in the
law would thus be to say that justice and injustice are unimportant
in the law.
Good, in contrast to the right, is linked with purposes and in-
terests, ends and goals, fulfillment, values and the valuable, and
with what ought to be." The law today may speak less confidently
and explicitly of what is good or valuable for persons. But the law
clearly relies constantly on related ideas, such as that of compelling
governmental interests, 2 and the fundamental interests 3 or liberty
7. See, e.g., RONALD DwoaKIN, FREEDOii'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961);
WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FuNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL
REASONING (1919).
8. See, e.g., RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUsLY 81-130 (1977)
(developing his well-known "right answers" thesis).
9. Cf id. at 188-89 (noting the distinction between having a right to act in
a particular way and that act's being the right thing to do).
10. For elaboration, see, for example, Elizabeth M. Pybus, False Dichoto-
mies: Right and Good, 58 PHIL. 19, 20 (1983).
11. See Anne MacLean, Right and Good: False Dichotomy?, 60 PHIL. 129,
129 (1985); Pybus, supra note 10, at 20. Good in this sense is often linked with
the idea of the good life, as in Justice Brennan's dissent in Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
12. See, e.g., Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An
Essential but Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV.
917 (1988).
13. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2268 (1997).
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interests" of persons. For good reasons, the law is reluctant to
choose among possible ways of flourishing or living well, at least
within limits. It is also true, however, that the law-even interna-
tional law-commonly rejects at least overt torture as incompatible
with human flourishing and the good life, even if the law does so
under the rubric of human rights.
The possible distinction between the right and the good has, in
contrast, been consciously and explicitly central to many well-
regarded twentieth century political and moral philosophers. John
Rawls, for example, has consistently treated a distinction between
the right and the good as fundamental to his approach to justice and
to political liberalism.15 More broadly, it has recently been argued
that "lilt is a commonplace among modern moral philosophers that
the good and the right are the central and most important moral
concepts."6
Some sort of distinction between the right and the good thus
seems initially promising for legal purposes. Lawyers and judges
may not commonly refer explicitly to a distinction between the right
and the good. They do refer often to justice, to legal duties, to inter-
ests, and occasionally even to values.17 The philosophers seem to
think that an explicit right versus good distinction is crucial, but
practicing lawyers and judges do not appear to agree. There are two
ways to explain why the law does not seem to rely explicitly on a
distinction between the right and the good. It may well be that the
law actually does rely on the right-good distinction, but only in an
implicit, disguised form, using different concepts or different termi-
nology. The other possibility is that the law often believes that the
right-good distinction really does not have much to offer. We have
seen, for example, that justice and the right belong on one side of
this divide, and interests of all sorts, along with the human good, on
14. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278
(1990).
15. JOHN RAwLS, POLITICAL LBERALISm 173 (1993); JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE 31-32 (1971); John Rawls, The Priority of Right and Ideas of the
Good, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 251, 251 (1988); see also J.L.A. Garcia, The Right
and the Good, 21 PHILOSOPHIA 235, 235 (1992) (noting the centrality of the
right-good distinction in the work of Rawls).
16. Garcia, supra note 15, at 235; see also Lawrence C. Becker, Good Lives:
Prolegomena, 9 Soc. PHIL. & POLY 15, 22 (1992) (assuming that a moral theory
will either define the right in terms of some quantity of the good, or will some-
how define the right in such a way as to render it at least partially independent
of the good).
17. As to the latter, see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856
(1992) (plurality opinion) ("The Constitution serves human values.... ."). For a
reference to the idea of "the good life" that is vaguely skeptical at some, if not
all levels, see Justice Brennan's opinion in Michael H., 491 U.S. at 141
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the other. 8 But the law sometimes seeks justice through finda-
mental rights and fundamental interests and uses these latter
ideas, in practice, as synonyms." Which is racial discrimination, a
matter of injustice and failure to act rightly, or else, on the side of
the good, a suppression of human potential and a denial of human
fulfillment? Which of these two approaches to racial discrimination
is more basic than the other?
We will explore below how the legal system actually attempts to
rely on some version of the general right versus good distinction.
First, however, we should explore some reasons for skepticism about
the scope and the real usefulness, in philosophy and in the law, of
this distinction. Despite the widespread enthusiasm among leading
modern philosophers for distinguishing the right from the good, the
distinction is actually of very limited scope and value. Worse, the
distinction, however formulated, may lead the law into very serious
errors.
Philosophers may think highly of the right-good distinction.
Let us notice, however, that ordinary speakers do not consistently
adhere to any such distinction. Popular use of the terms "right" and"good" "in fact is rather indiscriminate."" Thus even a few philoso-
phers have concluded that, for example, "it does not matter for ordi-
nary purposes whether we speak of 'right' or 'good' conduct, 'wrong'
or 'bad' motives,""' or that there is "no interesting difference be-
tween an action's being morally wrong and its being morally evil."22
18. For a discussion of this dichotomy, see supra notes 10-11 and accompa-
nying text.
19. Note the lack of any systematic distinction between constitutionally
fundamental interests and constitutionally fimdamental rights in, for example,
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2267-68; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753
(1982); and San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973). Of
course, not every liberty interest amounts to a constitutionally protected fun-
damental right. See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279. But interests recognized as
constitutionally fundamental are typically treated as constitutionally funda-
mental rights. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 29-37.
20. Charles Larmore, The Right and the Good, 20 PMLOSOPmA 15, 15
(1990); see also RICHARD B. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT 7
(1979) ("Even if linguistic intuitions pointed to more precise paraphrases of
normative terminology than they actually do, one would not want to rely on
them for guidance in normative reflection. For language might well embody
confusing distinctions, or fail to make distinctions it is important to make.").
21. HENRY SIDGwICK, OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF ETHICS 6 (Hackett Publ'g
1988) (1902); see also CHARLES L. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE 97 (1944)
("Certain theorists are accustomed to make a sharp distinction between 'good'
and 'right,' as though the terms involved quite disparate problems of analysis.
The present writer can find little ground for such a distinction, either in com-
mon usage or elsewhere.").
22. Garcia, supra note 15, at 242; see also id. at 241 ("[W]e should reject the
thesis that moral rightness has an entirely different kind of basis from that of
moral goodness.").
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Of course, our language does set limits to the literal inter-
changeability of "right" and "good." We might say, for example, that
someone is a good person, but we would not say that the same indi-
vidual is a "right" person.' This hardly shows, however, that there
is no relationship between being a good person and generally trying
to do the right thing. It may well be that our uses of "right" and"good" differ in other ways. For example, it is probably more com-
mon to think of rightness when we think of acts, and of goodness
when we think of states of affairs or outcomes of acts.24 We say that
a given choice was the right thing to do, and that it is good that
things turned out as they did. On the other hand, we also talk of
setting things right, of things being rightly ordered or rightly ar-
ranged, and of something being a good thing to do. This does not
seem to vary depending on whether the context is legal or not.
Nor does the degree of wrongness of an act always track the
harmfulness or badness of its consequences. Thus the right, or its
absence, need not always track the good, or its absence. Victims can
die as a result of justifiable, excusable, negligent, or intentional
acts, without the degree of deadness of the victim or most other con-
sequences varying much in their badness. This does not mean that
the harmfulness or bad consequences of murder are never worse
than those of a merely negligent homicide." They may well typi-
cally be worse. But the wrongness of a killing does not always pre-
cisely parallel the badness of its consequences. Common sense sug-
gests, however imprecisely, that deliberate murder is much more
wrong than, say, an excusable or accidental killing. It may be that
the harms or bad consequences of a deliberate murder are also typi-
cally worse than those of a mere excusable killing. But there seems
to be a bigger difference between the wrongness of deliberate mur-
der and of excusable killing than there is between the harmfulness,
to any affected party, of deliberate murder and excusable killing.
The bad consequences of a contract killing and of an accidental
killing may, to the victim and her loved ones, be rather similar. The
difference in the moral and legal wrongfulness of these two forms of
killing seems typically greater.
23. See STEVENSON, supra note 21, at 97.
24. See JOHN BROOME, WEIGHING GOODS: EQUALITY, UNCERTAINTY AND TIME
3 (1991) (but then going on to reject the distinction between the nature of an act
and all of its consequences); see also Michael Stocker, Rightness and Goodness:
Is There a Difference?, 10 Am. PHIL. Q. 87, 87 (1973) ("[R]ightness and goodness
are the same thing so far as ethical considerations are concerned; and if there is
any difference between them, this has to do with the different ontological status
of what they evaluate: acts or states of affairs."); cf W.D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND
THE GOOD 7, 156 (Oxford Univ. Press 1946) (1930) (describing right and wrong
as referring to acts done, and good and bad to the underlying motive).
25. See Stocker, supra note 24, at 95 ('That I intentionally or knowingly
injure you is, itself, bad; bad, that is, apart from the mere injury.").
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There are thus some sorts of differences between the right and
the good, but we already have some grounds to suspect that those
differences may be limited to particular purposes and contexts. We
have no grounds to believe that the right and the good are somehow
of different statuses or degrees of objectivity." But if neither is
more "solid" or more real than the other, should we nonetheless say
that one is logically prior to the other?
Logical priority means roughly that the ideas of the right and
the good do not operate on the same level. The one idea grounds,
justifies, gives rise to, or limits and constrains the other more so
than vice versa. If someone defines the right in terms of the good,
for example-say, that the right thing to do is whatever produces
the best consequences-one has implied that the right is more de-
pendent upon the good than the opposite, and that the good is logi-
cally prior to the right.
The logical priority of the good to the right, or of the right to the
good, has frequently been thought crucial. John Rawls's theory is
merely the current leading example in this regard. Rawls acknowl-
edges that the right and the good are both necessary and that they
are indeed complementary. But for Rawls, "[t]he idea of the priority
of right is an essential element in... 'political liberalism' and it has
a central role injustice as fairness." 27 Rawls goes on to elaborate:
The principles of right, and so of justice, put limits on which
satisfactions have value; they impose restrictions on what are
reasonable conceptions of one's good.... [I1n justice as fairness
the concept of the right is prior to that of the good. A just so-
cial system defines the scope within which individuals must
develop their aims. ... [I]nterests requiring the violation of
justice have no value.2
26. Cf Garcia, supra note 15, at 241 ("[We should reject the thesis that
moral rightness has an entirely different kind of basis from that of moral good-
ness.").
27. JoHN RAWLS, POUTIcAL LIBERALISM 173 (1993). On the importance of
this question, see Will Kymlicka, Rawls on Teleology and Deontology, 17 PHIL.
& PuB. AFF. 173, 173 (1988) ("The question of whether the right or the good is
prior is now seen as a central dividing point for contemporary political theo-
ries.").
28. JoHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 31 (1971). Note that Rawls seems to
want to put "value" on the side of justice and the right. But this merely illus-
trates the limited scope and value of the overall distinction. It would be just as
easy to link judgments of value with judgments as to what is good or what is in
someone's interests. Value would then appear on the side of the good. Rawls
then goes on to conclude that "[tihis priority of the right over the good injustice
as fairness turns out to be a central feature of the conception." Id. at 31-32.
Will Kymlicka among others finds this alleged priority misleading. Kymlicka
argues that "Rawls treats the right as a spelling-out of the requirement that
each person's good be given equal consideration." Kymlicka, supra note 27, at
190.
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Rawls thus argues that the right is prior to the good and that
this is important. Other modern philosophers have argued for a
similar priority.29 Often, this priority is argued for on the grounds
that merely producing the best possible consequences may result in
unfairness or injustice to particular persons." We would not want
to convict an innocent defendant merely to slightly enhance the
overall net balance of good in the world. Often, it is argued that
acts can be right apart from their consequences.3 These sorts of ar-
guments, however, really do not establish the priority of the right to
the good.
Suppose, for example, that convicting a defendant pays off
nicely in terms of good consequences, but is unfair to the scapegoat
defendant. Why can't we simply decide that unfairness to an inno-
cent defendant counts as a very bad consequence indeed, perhaps
sufficient to categorically trump or outweigh the good consequences
of the act? Can unfairness really be separated from all of the conse-
quences, in a broad sense, of the unfair decision? Even the effect on
the character of the decisionmaker could count as a consequence.
The wrongness of the unjust conviction could then be explainable in
terms of its bad overall consequences. If we wish to, we can say that
some sorts of consequences should count as absolutely or irre-
deemably bad.
As well, why should we feel bound to judge the rightness of acts
entirely apart from all of their consequences? It may make sense to
argue, for example, that fulfilling a legal contract or keeping a
promise is right whether or not that act has the consequence of ac-
tually reinforcing the system of promise-keeping.32 Admittedly, we
do not normally encourage persons to imagine various good and bad
consequences before deciding whether to keep their promises. But
don't we ultimately look to consequences to justify contracting or
promise-keeping as an institution? Why would we bother with the
institution of contracts or promise-keeping unless it generally led to
good consequences? Why have contracts or promise-keeping, gener-
ally, if promise-keeping generally undercuts human interests and
29. See, e.g., H.A. PRIcHARD, DOES MORAL PHILoSoPHY REST ON A MISTAKE?,
in MORAL OBLIGATION: ESSAYS AND LEcTURES 1, 10 (1949) ("[A] morally good ac-
tion is morally good not simply because it is a right action but because it is a
right action done because it is right, i.e. from a sense of obligation."); Ross, su-
pra note 24, at 46-47 ("[A]n act is not right because it, being one thing, produces
good results different from itself; it is right because it is itself the production of
a certain state of affairs. Such production is right in itself, apart from any con-
sequence.").
30. See, e.g., RAWLs, supra note 28, at 26.
31. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 24, at 46-47.
32. See id.
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human fulfillment? If we couldn't justify promise-keeping in terms
of good net consequences, how could we morally justify it at all?33
Should we say, then, that Rawls and other writers simply have
it backwards, and that actually, the good is prior to the right? A
number of modern philosophers have endorsed such an approach.
G.E. Moore, for example, famously argued that "to assert that a cer-
tain line of conduct is ... right or obligatory, is obviously to assert
that more good or less evil will exist in the world, if it be adopted
than if anything else be done instead."34 The contemporary philoso-
pher L.W. Sumner writes that "[t]he idea that the unifying-and
justifying-function of all of our ethical categories is ultimately to
make our lives go better, or to make the world a better place, is one
that I find utterly compelling."35 This would prioritize the good.
33. It is certainly possible to complicate matters by arguing that the right
is only partially or in some contexts prior to the good, but this would not change
our ultimate analysis. For some relevant discussion, see James Griffin, The
Human Good and the Ambitions of Consequentialism, 9 Soc. PHIL. & POLY 118,
132 (1992).
34. GEORGE EDWARD MOORE, PRINcIPIA ETHICA 25 (1971); see also A.C. Fox,
The Right and the Good Once More, 28 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 1, 1 (1950)
(making "a plea for the necessary dependence of the right upon the good, and of
the ought-to-do upon the ought-to-be"); A.E. Taylor, The Right and the Good, 49
MIND 219, 223 (1940) ("What is our standard when we compare the relative
gravity of departures from right? I do not see where to find it unless in the
badness of the acts compared."). Some philosophers who believe in the priority
of the good to the right are called consequentialists, of which utilitarians would
be a sub-group. For a discussion of consequentialism, see Judith Lichtenberg,
The Right, the All Right, and the Good, 92 YALE L.J. 544, 545 (1983) (reviewing
SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM (1982)) ("All
[consequentialist] theories hold some kind of stuff to be intrinsically good and
define rightness-right action-in terms of that good."). See also Germain
Grisez, Against Consequentialism, 23 AM. J. JURIS. 21 (1978) (analyzing conse-
quentialist theories). One can, however, believe in the priority of the good to
the right without also being a consequentialist. See, e.g., L.W. Sumner, Two
Theories of the Good, 9 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 1, 2 & n.1 (1992). And one could ac-
cept some theory in which the good is somehow only partially prior to the right.
See, e.g., WILLIAM K. FRANKENA, ETHICS 79-80 (1963); C.D. Broad, Some of the
Main Problems of Ethics, 21 PHIL. 99, 105 (1946) (stating "[olne characteristic
which tends to make an act right is that it will produce at least as good conse-
quences as any alternative open to the agent in the circumstances," but going
on to contrast the reason for the rightness of promise-keeping).
35. Sumner, supra note 34, at 1. Sumner continues: "What else could mo-
rality be for? And if it is not for anything-if it has no point-what claim can it
have on our allegiance?" Id. Among classical philosophers, one could cite, for
example, Aquinas and Aristotle as centrally concerned with the category of the
good. See 1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. I-II, question 94, art.
2, at 1009 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros.
1947) ("[Glood is that which all things seek after. Hence this is the first precept
of law, that good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. All other
precepts of the natural law are based upon this . . .. "); ARISTOTLE, ETHICA
NIcOMACHEA bk. I, ch. 2, 1094a1-1094a3, at 308, in INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE
(Richard McKeon ed., W.D. Ross trans., 1947) ("[Elvery action and pursuit, is
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This line of argument has great appeal. Surely morality cannot
amount to an ultimately pointless exercise if it is also to have any
rationally binding force. And the point of morality must, we might
imagine, lie ultimately in promoting well-being, or someone's good.
Surely better lives must be rationally preferable to worse lives.
But to focus on the good, or more specifically on maximizing the
good, seems incomplete and unattractive. As soon as we start to
clarify what we mean by promoting the good, we find that we must
refer to ideas of the right, of fairness, of justice, and of distributional
concerns generally. The idea of good, unless it expands to swallow
up the right, does not seem to take proper account of ideas such as
integrity, respect, commitment, dignity, the specialness of certain
social relationships, infinite personal value, and the irreplaceability
of persons.
Suppose we start out to maximize the good, and that we have
some idea of what the good consists of. Even at a very early stage,
considerations of the right, and of justice and fairness, inevitably
creep in and must somehow be addressed. We must, for example, in
maximizing the good, ask the basic question: Who counts? Does
everyone count equally? Do all people near the very end of life
count equally? Do people who will probably exist fifty years from
now count equally? Do sentient animals count equally? Does a
close relative count equally with a complete stranger? Do people
classified as incompetent all count equally? Does a member of one's
own group count equally with those outside the group? Does one to
whom I have made a promise count equally with one to whom I
have not? How should we count the dependent, the vulnerable, and
the helpless? How should we count the good of those who have cul-
pably violated basic moral and legal principles? How does the pos-
sibility that we could increase or decrease the number of future per-
sons, or of future sentient beings, relate to maximizing the good? 6
What if people differ in their ability to create or appreciate the
good? What if we rightly decide that there are many different forms
of the good, and many different ways of living a good or flourishing
life? 7 How are we then to add up or compare quantities of the good
in such cases?
thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been de-
clared to be that at which all things aim.").
36. Some of these and other considerations have led one important con-
temporary philosopher to deemphasize, over time, the role and status of the
good, as contrasted with the right, in political ethics. See generally BRIAN
BARRY, A TREATISE ON SOCIAL JUSTICE (1995), as discussed in Richard J. Arne-
son, The Priority of the Right over the Good Rides Again, 108 ETHIcs 169, 169-
70 (1997).
37. See, e.g., Neil MacCormick, Natural Law and the Separation of Law
and Morals, in NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEfPORARY ESSAYS 105, 127-28
(Robert P. George ed., 1992). Of course, there are also various forms of moral
and nonmoral goodness. For typologies of these various forms of the good, see
GEORGE HENRIK VON WRIGHT, THE VARIETIES OF GOODNESS 8-11 (1963) and Ju-
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The problem is not that the priority of the good does not by it-
self tell us much. Deciding that the good should be prior to the right
certainly does not suggest even the outlines of a complete ethical or
legal theory. But this hardly impeaches the alleged priority of the
good. Rather, the problem is that one cannot outline an ethical or
legal theory of the good without crucially relying on the ideas of the
right, of fairness, and of justice. As the questions above suggest,
one cannot specify a process of legally or morally pursuing the good
that does not depend on some view about fairness in distributing or
counting the good.
Thus neither the right nor the good is prior to the other. They
are instead inevitably built into each other, and inherently insepa-
rable from each other.38 No plausible moral or legal theory can sim-
ply adopt a basic view of the right and only then go on to address
questions of the good, or vice versa. There can be no plausible the-
ory of the right independent of the good, and no plausible theory of
the good independent of the right. Doubtless this seems like a
rather abstract, formal point. We shall now see, however, that it
has crucial implications for contemporary legal systems, and for
constitutional law in particular.
II. LOSiNG CONFIDENCE IN THE SPLIT BETWEEN RIGHT AND GOOD:
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE LAW OF THE INTERDEPENDENCE
OF THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD
A Paternalism and Legal Justice
We have just introduced the inseparability of doing the right,
just, or fair thing on the one hand, and pursuing a good or valued
life on the other. The distinction seems no less hazy at either the
individual or the societal level. That is, there is no clearer line be-
tween societal justice and the ways in which citizens in general are
allowed to lead their lives in pursuit of their good than there is be-
tween the just treatment of a given individual person and whether
dith Jarvis Thomson, On Some Ways in Which a Thing Can Be Good, 9 Soc.
PHIL. & PoLy 96 (1992).
38. See, e.g., MacLean, supra note 11, at 129 ("[Slome conception of the
good is involved in characterizing actions as right or wrong."); Pybus, supra
note 10, at 20-22 (arguing for interdependence and complementarity of these
two aspects of morality); Henry S. Richardson, Beyond Good and Right: Toward
a Constructive Ethical Pragmatism, 24 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 108, 129 (1995)
("Rather than seeing the right as constraining the (pursuit of the) good, the
constructive ethical pragmatist will hold that the right is to be built into the
good (and vice versa)."). We will not need to argue for the more ambitious
proposition that the good and the right are not only inseparable, but utterly
identical, or even that they are merely two ways of looking at the same thing,
or perhaps "two sides of the same coin," depending upon what this familiar if
rather unclear expression is thought to mean.
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that person is allowed to pursue her own view of how to best lead
her own life.
The supposed line between the right and the good is thus dubi-
ous. A moment's thought suggests, however, that this is not an in-
consequential matter. Most obviously, a rejection of broad, fre-
quent, intrusive paternalism is a feature of our legal system.39 Of
course, our legal system holds many acts to be legally wrong or un-
just, as in the case of, say, rape, theft, or failure to pay taxes. Cru-
cially, though, with some exceptions, the legal system generally
seeks to avoid coercively imposing particular conceptions of the good
life on competent adults who consistently reject those conceptions
over time." Thus the government does not prohibit watching pro
wrestling, consuming hot dogs, and buying celebrity gossip maga-
zines, or require fitness walking, adult education, and spinach con-
sumption.
But if the right and the good are inseparable, in the sense of
mutually informing and mutually constituting each other, can any
legal system really avoid arbitrariness and inconsistency in this re-
spect? If the right is at least in part composed of the good, and vice
versa, how can this general antipaternalism be coherent and defen-
sible? How can any legal system coercively impose the right and the
just, while being generally neutral toward and tolerant of diverse
understandings of the good life, of what is valuable, and of human
flourishing? How can a legal system impose particular views of
what is right and just, but not of what is good and valuable?
The contemporary legal theorist John Finnis, for example, has
sought to undermine standard theories of antipaternalism in this
way.4 If the right and the good are so difficult to separate, how can
the law impose controversial views of the former, but not of the lat-
ter? If justice cannot be disentangled from the good life or human
flourishing, why should the law mandate a certain view of the for-
mer, but liberally tolerate diverse views of the latter? How can it
take this approach without arbitrariness, if not a pathologically
split personality?
39. See, e.g., Michael D. Bayles, Criminal Paternalism, in THE LIiTs OF
THE LAW 174 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1974); Rosemary
Carter, Justifying Paternalism, 7 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 133 (1977); Bernard Gert &
Charles M. Culver, The Justification of Paternalism, 89 ETHIcs 199 (1979).
40. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in PRIVATE AND PUBLIC MORALITY
125, 127 (Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978) ("[P]olitical decisions must be, so far as
is possible, independent of any particular conception of the good life, or of what
gives value to life."); Charles Larmore, Political Liberalism, 18 POL. THEORY
339, 341 (1990) (arguing liberalism "aims to be neutral with respect to contro-
versial views of the good life"); Jeremy Waldron, Theoretical Foundations of
Liberalism, 37 PHIL. Q. 127, 128 (1987) ("[Lliberals are committed to a concep-
tion of freedom and of respect for the capacities and agency of individual men
and women.. ").
41. JOHN FINqs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 222 (1980).
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In particular, Finnis suggests that the legal system arbitrarily
categorizes those rules it disfavors as rules about the good or hu-
man flourishing, rather than about justice or the right.42 Thus any
attempt to legally impose such a rule is labeled as "paternalism,"
and is disfavored. On the other hand, rules favored by the legal sys-
tem are said either to fit within some exception to the general bar
against paternalism, or to be matters of right and justice, and not
merely about some controversial view of what is good. But-and
this is the crucial point for Finnis-any particular understanding of
the good life or human flourishing for a person or for a society can
be "translated" into a claim about what is legally just and right.4
3
Thus the claims of even the most intrusive busybody can be refor-
mulated into claims about justice and the "trump card" of rights.
This argument seems to threaten basic legal values. Must the
legal system just admit to its hypocrisy and arbitrariness in this re-
spect, and thereby perhaps legitimize endless legal intrusions into
what is central to our personal identities? If the law prohibits, say,
rape or racial discrimination, does it thereby legitimize legally com-
pulsory attendance at piano recitals or pie-eating contests? Or if
the law prohibits racial discrimination, is the door thereby opened
to laws requiring racial segregation on what would initially be
thought of as paternalistic grounds, but now merely translated into
claims about justice for some selected person or group? Can every
personal preference about the good be refitted as a claim about en-
forceable right and justice? If so, we would not settle much by de-
claring that the government should not impose controversial ideas
of the good. Every claim about the good could be turned into a claim
about justice and the right.
One possible way of responding to Finnis, and addressing this
concern, would be to claim that there is a crucial difference between
deciding for others and deciding for oneself. On this approach,
there is a crucial moral difference between, say, deciding that one
will abstain from alcohol, and imposing a legal prohibition of alcohol
on all competent adults, regardless of their refusal to agree. The
latter, paternalistic step, taken over the protests of many of those
most directly affected, is said to violate an underlying principle of
the equal moral agency of persons." A legal rule that allows person
A to decide whether person A shall drink, and that allows person B
(only) to decide whether person B shall drink is said to respect the
moral equality ofbothA and B. On the other hand, a legal rule that
imposes A's preference on B, and not B's on A, and disallows B's
42. Id.
43. Id. ("[T]there is no difficulty in translating any 'paternalist' political
preference into the language of entitlement....").
44. See Wojciech Sadurski, The Right, the Good and the Jurisprude, 7 L. &
PMIL. 35, 46-47 (1988).
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preferences even for B's own behavior, is said to violate the moral
equality of A and B.45
This is, however, a tricky business. Suppose first that A wants
to racially discriminate against C, who does not care about A's pol-
icy, and that A genuinely and freely does not care whether B dis-
criminates against anyone. B is horrified, but not directly or per-
sonally affected, by A's discrimination against C. Person A thus
wants (personally) to discriminate, but does not want to impose a
uniform nondiscrimination rule on everyone, regardless of their be-
liefs. The person who seeks legally to control other persons' drink-
ing may violate the equal moral agency of persons. What of the per-
son who seeks legally to control other persons' hiring practices, even
if the person to be protected against discrimination is indifferent to
the rule?
In such cases, though, B can at least argue that A's discrimina-
tion affects a third person, C, directly. Realistically, C is unlikely to
be indifferent to personal discrimination. So B has something to
say in defense of a nondiscrimination rule even if A claims that
equal moral agency could be fulfilled by flipping a coin to choose be-
tween A's policy and B's or that A's discriminatory preferences
should be respected half the time, and B's universal nondiscrimina-
tion policy the other half the time. To discriminate is to decide cer-
tain things not only for oneself, but also for others.
Every important personal preference, however, is likely to have
some effects, consensual and nonconsensual, on third parties. Ac-
tually, no preference, personal or more explicitly social, is without
its external effects. Our legal system, though, often follows John
Stuart Mill in trying to distinguish acts that primarily affect the in-
terests of other, unconsenting persons, and acts that primarily af-
fect oneself. 6 But this boundary is frequently hazy and indetermi-
nate. Busybodies can eventually learn to reformulate their
concerns, and to couch them in the language of justice and social
rights.
After all, the essence of a claim of unjust discrimination may be
that A and D have entered into a voluntary contract without ade-
quately and fairly considering someone else's abilities, talents, or
interests. Suppose, instead, that A and D propose to buy and sell
some controversial item between themselves, and that FMB-a
formerly mere busybody-knows about their transaction. Why
must FMB argue only that FMB's bare knowledge should be enough
to scotch the transaction between A and D? Why should FMB stop
at arguing that the psychological distress from bare knowledge of
this transaction outweighs the benefits flowing from the transac-
tion? Why can't FMB argue that A and D's transactions contribute
45. See id.
46. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. IV (David Spitz ed., 1975)
(1859).
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to changing gradually the nature and character of the overall soci-
ety for everyone, perhaps in ways A and D themselves do not appre-
ciate or endorse? Why can't FMB argue that A and D thus change
the society that FMB must live in for the worse, without FMB's con-
sent? Why can't FMB argue that A and D are actually impairing
FMB's potential development in important ways? Why aren't A and
D violating some alleged right held by FMB? And if A and D are
violating FMB's rights or treating FMB unjustly, FMB is not being
a mere busybody in objecting.
Doubtless A and D could make parallel arguments about FMB's
favored policies, but that is just the point. It is difficult to rule out
most policies formerly thought of as merely paternalistic, but now
defended on grounds of alleged right, fairness, and justice, simply
by a broad appeal to the equal moral agency of persons. The equal
moral agency of persons, by itself, will not rule gross paternalistic
impositions in the name of justice. The right and the good are too
intertwined and too inseparable for such a simple, general argu-
ment to succeed.
What, then, can be said to former mere busybodies who now
talk the language of rights, justice, fairness, and equality? As we
have seen, no quick, general disqualification is possible." But this
does not leave us defenseless against FMBs. Suppose someone ar-
gues that her individual potential will be crushed, in an unjust and
rights-violative kind of way, unless we all spend time juggling or,
alternatively, unless we all forswear juggling even in the privacy of
our own homes. Why not look at the merits of her claim, from eve-
ryone's perspective, impartially? Merely to assert a right, after all,
is not yet to establish or justify an actual enforcement-worthy right.
We cannot, of course, herein offer a substantive theory of justice.
But ideas such as intrusion, privacy, dignity, personal identity for-
mation, autonomy, personal freedom, exploration and experimenta-
tion, and fulfillment through individual choice are not so empty as
always to point equally strongly in both directions whenever anyone
seeks to dress up a paternalist claim in the language of justice and
rights. Claims of justice and the right can always be made, but this
does not mean they can always be made convincingly. Not all
claims about justice and the right become equally plausible merely
47. For an interesting formulation of the same underlying problem, see Jef-
frie G. Murphy, Legal Moralism and Liberalism, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 73, 87 (1995).
One cherished commitment that might be vulnerable is The Harm
Principle itself. Although there may be practical reasons that will of-
ten weigh against the state seeking to promote virtue, what reason of
principle would require society to limit its coercive powers to pre-
venting rights violations when those rights themselves get their na-
ture and importance from some human good they seek to respect? I
see no clear reason.
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because we realize that unconsenting third parties may be ad-
versely affected by any legal rule at all, of any sort.
In the juggling case, for example, we can begin by asking about
numbers of persons affected, concrete interests involved, centrality
to personality, and, if we wish, the depth and permanence of feeling
of all parties affected. We can reflect on the rational cogency of the
claims made and their logical linkages. Not every claim will be
equally convincing. We can work through the complex application
of the ideas referred to above. Finally, and perhaps more interest-
ingly, we could think about precedential and incentive effects, the
potential for manipulation involved, and whether any preoccupation
with juggling or its prohibition was freely or else arbitrarily arrived
at. Crucially, we would ask whether the preoccupation with jug-
gling could be interestingly defended in rational terms. Or does the
claimant immediately retreat into unshareable personal experience
or private mystery? Even unshareable private experience can some-
times be linked to something we know about the public world. Is
there no possibility of developing or rebutting the argument, to even
a minimal extent, based on accessible evidence and public argumen-
tative standards? Is any portion of the argument subject to any sort
of confirmation or disconfirmation? We certainly need not insist on
certainty, as opposed to probabilities, if we wish.
Ultimately, we should feel pessimistic about the fairness and
power of such arguments only if we believe something like the sub-
jectivity or relativity of all standards or in the inevitable rational in-
terminability of all such debates. If instead we think that, in for-
mulating and applying legal rules, some answers may be better
than some other answers, we have no reason to feel defenseless be-
fore former mere busybodies who adopt the language of justice and
right.
B. Can the Good Be More Subjective Than the Right?
We have suggested that the right and the good are inseparable
at the most fundamental level. This apparently abstract point ac-
tually has crucial implications for an increasingly popular approach
to law and the enforcement of moral views. Let us introduce the
problem in the words of the contemporary philosopher George Sher:
For some important reason-I am honestly not sure what-
many liberals have concluded that reason's scope is drastically
limited. Though still confident about our ability to reach uni-
versally applicable conclusions about justice and rightness,
these thinkers are much less sanguine about the prospects for
reaching reasoned conclusions about goodness or value. There
is, in their view, some sort of important asymmetry between
what reason can hope to show us about what persons are mor-
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ally obligated to do and what it can hope to show us about how
it is best to live.4
Now, if the right and the good are as inseparable as we have sug-
gested, it seems curious to believe the right to be more reason-
governed than the good. We need not speculate as to all of the pos-
sible reasons for having more confidence in conclusions about the
right than about the good. Let us focus instead on one important
line of contemporary thinking.
A number of contemporary schools of thought inside and out-
side of the law have concluded that all of the claims we make about
both the right and the good are less substantial, less solid, and less
real than has commonly been supposed. This general spirit is cap-
tured by the report that "[k]nowledge and truth are fantasies. Ob-
jectivity is unattainable. Foundationalism is dead. We are limited
to our historically situated, subjective perspectives. So we are told
by postmodern scholars both inside and outside legal academe."49
Any number of different approaches, inside and outside of law
schools, have abandoned the traditional general idea of objective
truth, in moral and jurisprudential issues and elsewhere. Camps
such as pragmatism," relativism, 1 subjectivism, 2 error theory,"
48. GEORGE SHER, BEYOND NEUTRALITY: PERFECTIONISM AND POLITICS at ix
(1997).
49. Ken Kress, Modern Jurisprudence, Postmodern Jurisprudence, and
Truth, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1871, 1871 (1997) (reviewing DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW
AND TRUTH (1996)). Ronald Dworkin offers a more elaborate characterization of
generally anti-objectivist schools of thought:
Is there any objective truth? Or must we finally accept that at bot-
tom.... there is no "real" or "objective" or "absolute" or "foundational"
or "fact of the matter" or "right answer" truth about anything, that
even our most confident convictions about ... who is wicked are just
our convictions, just conventions, just ideology, just badges of power,
just the rules of the language games we choose to play, just the prod-
uct of our irrepressible disposition to deceive ourselves that we have
discovered out there in some external, objective, timeless, mind-
independent world what we have actually invented ourselves, out of
instinct, imagination, and culture? The latter view ... now domi-
nates fashionable intellectual style.
Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 87, 87 (1996); see also William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for
Truth as a First Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1 (1995). Professor
Marshall introduces his argument in the following terms: "Contemporary philo-
sophical thought, it is said, does not believe in truth, at least in the 'objective'
or 'transcendent' sense of the word. To the contemporary mind, objective or
transcendent truth is seen as nonsensical or, at best, unintelligible." Id. at 2
(citing C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25
UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legiti-
mizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1). For purposes of his article, Professor Marshall
is agnostic on the existence of any objective truth. See id. at 4.
50. See, e.g., HaARY PUTNAMi, THE MANY FACES OF REALISM 77-78 (1987)
("[Olur moral beliefs, in my view, are not approximations to The Universe's
Own Moral Truths ... ."); RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLI-
[Vol. 33
LEGAL THEORY
quasi-realism,4 noncognitivism," and skepticism or nihilism56 agree
in watering down, if not flatly rejecting, familiar understandings-
whether commonsensical or naive-of the language of right, good,
and justice.57
For the sake of convenience, let us refer to all of the above
schools by the single term "subjectivism," to highlight the contrast
with those who pursue a more objective truth. This broadly defined
subjectivism is enormously popular and influential, and we shall
address it in Part IV below. For the moment, though, we shall focus
on a popular compromise, or split of the legal personality, between
subjectivism and objectivism. We are seeking to explain the current
tendency, noted by Professor Sher,58 to accept the rational objectiv-
ity of justice and the right, while at the same time assuming the
subjectivity of the good. 9
One useful explanation of this split of the personality starts
against the background of some sort of general moral subjectivism.
Let us assume that someone starts out as some sort of subjectivist.
Despite the popularity of broad moral subjectivism, it is certainly
DARITY 173 (1989) ("I do not think there are... any neutral grounds] on which
to stand and argue that either torture or kindness are preferable. .. ").
51. See, e.g., DAVID B. WONG, MORAL RELATIVITY (1984); Gilbert Harman,
Moral Relativism Defended, in RELATIVISm: COGNITIVE AND MORAL 189 (Michael
Krausz & Jack W. Meiland eds., 1982); cf. Brenda Almond, Seven Moral Myths,
65 PHIL. 129, 131 (1990) ("It is no exaggeration to say that relativism is the
prevailing ideology of our schools and colleges at the present time."). For a use-
ful typology of possible relativist claims, see ROM HARRE & MICHAEL KRAUSZ,
VARIETIES OF RELATIVISM (1996).
52. See, e.g., Judith Lichtenberg, Subjectivism as Moral Weakness Pro-
jected, 33 PHIL. Q. 378 (1983); Steve F. Sapontzis, Groundwork for a Subjective
Theory of Ethics, 27 AiMl. PHIL. Q. 27 (1990).
53. See JOHN L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT,,ND WRONG (1977).
54. See Simon Blackburn, Errors and the Phenomenology of Value, in
MORALITY AND OBJECTIVITY 1 (Ted Honderich ed., 1985); Bernard Williams,
Truth in Ethics, 8 RATIO (n.s.) 227 (1995); Crispin Wright, Truth in Ethics, 8
RATIO (n.s.) 209 (1995).
55. See, e.g., ALLAN GBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS (1990); CHARLES
L. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LANGUAGE (1944); Nicholas Unwin, Can Emotivism
Sustain a Social Ethics?, 3 RATIO (n.s.) 64 (1990).
56. See, e.g., MACKIE, supra note 53; Richard T. Garner, On the Genuine
Queerness of Moral Properties and Facts, 68 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 137 (1990)
(discussing MACKIE, supra note 53); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Externalism, Internal-
ism and Moral Scepticism, 70 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 40 (1992) (same).
57. Members of these schools may, depending upon how their work is in-
terpreted, either belong to a school other than to which the above footnotes as-
sign them, or to more than one school. Examples of members of the above
schools could be multiplied almost indefinitely.
58. SHER, supra note 48, at ix.
59. One might want legally to impose rules of justice, but not of the good,
for reasons other than that one thinks justice to be more objective than the
good. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10-12
(1980) (discussing the value of experimentation, of autonomy, and of avoiding
concentrated authority even if the good is in some sense objective).
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possible to raise disturbing questions about such views. Consider,
for example, the candid response of the subjectivist to requests for
support by, let us say, a campus anti-racism or anti-rape group. No
doubt the subjectivist will want to support these groups, perhaps
with much personal effort, intense emotion, and for all sorts of ap-
pealing public reasons. What the subjectivist cannot say, however,
is that these groups are genuinely right in what they say and do,
unless "genuinely right" is defined in some watered down sense.
Given the wide range and variety of subjectivist views, we can-
not conveniently represent how the subjectivists would continue
their response. The relativist, for example, must say that the moral
status of rape does not and cannot transcend the standards of par-
ticular groups. If the relevant groups happen to be, say, statisti-
cally average young men and women, then the young men will have
some (sophisticated or simple) set of norms regarding rape, and the
young women will have theirs. Those standards set by the men and
the women may or may not correspond, or even partially overlap.
To the extent that they do not, there are no group-transcendent
norms to which they can appeal. Both groups can probe for incon-
sistencies, but if the ultimate standards of the men and women di-
verge, there is no possibility of any common appeal or any objec-
tively better or worse answers to seek out.
Realistically, it is unlikely that anti-racism or anti-rape groups
will long be satisfied with this state of affairs. This is likely to be so
even though relativism is group-based. Subjectivism or relativism
distorts the life experience of those who unjustly suffer. They are,
in effect, being told that their commitments, however fervently held,
are less fully rational and more ultimately arbitrary than they
imagine. Beliefs about racism or rape can be emotionally strong
and linked to public reasons, but they cannot really be deeply held
in the traditional sense. They cannot be true in the sense in which
traditional opponents of racism or rape have historically believed
them to be true. They are, perhaps, rather like fervently held foot-
ball team loyalties. Of course, victims of racism or of rape are reluc-
tant to accept this dilution. Some groups or persons, after all, profit
from injustice. Over the long term, it will take objective reasons to
surrender this unjust profit.
Let us suppose that the subjectivist and the anti-racism or anti-
rape group members have explored each other's views. Surely one
very natural result would be a sort of compromise, or dualism, of
just the sort referred to by Professor Sher." This general compro-
mise has now become a mainstream approach among legal theo-
rists." On this compromise, certain principles of justice or the right
60. SHER, supra note 48.
61. See KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 305 (stating that in mainstream Ameri-
can legal analysis, values-as distinguished from facts-are assumed to be
subjective and ultimately arbitrary, but reasoning that rights, and hence what
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would be given a privileged status. The wrongness or injustice of
rape and racism would, in our example, be deemed to be objective
and rationally secure. This would validate the concerns of the anti-
racism and anti-rape groups as able to withstand the deepest sorts
of challenge.
But on this compromise, the objectivity of certain principles of
justice and the right is not matched by any equally objective princi-
ples of the good. There is a split of the legal personality. The good
life, what one chooses to value, and what ought to be, is considered
more subjective than the right. This subjectivist part of the com-
promise would, superficially, appear to fit nicely with basic themes
of pluralism, tolerance, diversity, and libertarianism. If the good-
ness of good lives is subjective, why not let each person pursue her
own?
The subjectivity of the good life would accommodate, to some
degree, the sense that morality as a whole is not a matter of seeking
any objective truth. And on this compromise, those who come to ac-
cept certain principles of justice as objective would avoid an appar-
ent failure to appreciate the real moral nature and status of rape or
racism. If the good is, on the other hand, deemed more subjective
than the right, this compromise seems to promise the best of both
worlds. The trick, of course, will be to prevent an apparent com-
promise from unraveling into a mere split personality.
The idea of treating the good as more subjective than the right
is not only currently fashionable, but has some historical precedent.
The great political theorist Thomas Hobbes, for example, is some-
times interpreted as holding this view. It has thus been argued
that:
The basic idea behind Hobbes' political philosophy is that, in
nature, there is no basis for opinions of good and bad, and so
people are certain to disagree about what is good and bad, but
they can all agree on the need for peace and security. The lat-
ter need gives sense to the notions of the right, and to the
62sense of justice.
Whether this distinction is viable is actually extremely dubious.63
Our initial concern, however, is merely to establish an early pedi-
is right for government to do, are assumed to transcend mere arbitrary value
judgments); see also SHER, supra note 48, at ix (discussing the view of liberals
that there is asymmetry between what reason says is moral and what it says
about how best to live).
62. Sadurski, supra note 44, at 42.
63. If we try to assess the merits of Hobbes's distinction between the right
and the good, we might first ask, for example, whether people do in fact often
see involuntary starvation or child torture as attractive and legitimate avenues
of the good life, assuming these dimensions of the alleged good are separable
from issues of justice and the right. And we would also have to ask whether the
zealot, the Samurai, the martyr, the fanatic, the Klingon, the saint, or the war-
like is willing to rank peace and personal bodily safety as high as Hobbes re-
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gree for the modern view that the good is more subjective than the
right.
Hobbes does seem to fit in here. Consider Hobbes's classic dis-
cussion of the good:
[W]hatsoever is the object of any mans [sic] Appetite or Desire;
that is it, which he for his part calleth good. . .. For these
words of Good ... are ever used with relation to the person
that useth them: There being nothing simply and absolutely
so; nor any common Rule of Good and Evill [sic], to be taken
from the nature of the objects themselves ....
Contrast this subjectivist account of the good with Hobbes's discus-
sion of the first principles of justice and right action: "A law of na-
ture ... is a Precept, or generall [sic] Rule, found out by Reason, by
which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his
life . . . ."' Justice and right action are thus discussed in more ob-
jective terms. There is certainly no hint that the good, on the other
hand, is found out by some allegedly shared human reason."
There is, therefore, distinguished precedent for those who today
consider the good more subjective than the right. Precedent, how-
ever, does not make the idea coherent or viable. Treating the good
as more subjective than the right may still be just another manifes-
tation of a split legal personality. We already have some reason to
believe that the right and the good are nearly indistinguishable. If
so, it would make little sense to argue that the right is more objec-
tive and the good more subjective. We have even more reason to
believe that the right and the good are inseparable and that they
help define and constitute one another. 7
Now, if the right and the good were merely inseparable, this by
itself would not show that they must be equally objective or subjec-
tive. By a very loose analogy, someone might consider mind and
body to be inseparable, yet quite different in their basic natures.
But if, as we have argued, the right and the good crucially help de-
fine and constitute each other, it is much harder to see how one
could be more subjective than the other. The subjectivity or objec-
quires. Hobbes's distinction between the right and the good seems no more ap-
pealing and viable than anyone else's.
64. THOMfAS HOBBEs, LEviATHAN 39 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1991) (1651).
65. Id. at 91.
66. Charles Larmore points out, instead, that "for Hobbes, an object's being
good for a person consists in its being desired by him, that it is nothing but the
projection of his desire." Larmore, supra note 20, at 20; cf RALPH BARTON
PERRY, GENERAL THEORY OF VALUE: ITS MEANING AND BASIc PRINCIPLES
CONSTRUED IN TERMS OF INTEREST 604 n.13 (1926) ("Value is conditioned by the
occurrence of an interest-judgment, but not by the truth of that judgment. It is
a function of belief rather than of knowledge.").
67. For a discussion of the interrelatedness of the right and the good, see
supra Part I.
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tivity of the one would be inescapably imported and defined into the
other. Each would bear the quality of the other.
We thus have some grounds for doubting that the good can be
more subjective than the right. Let us pause to consider objections,
though. Isn't it clear, for example, that at least in some contexts the
good is undeniably subjective? Suppose someone says that choco-
late tastes good, or that chocolate tastes better than vanilla. Isn't
that obviously just a subjective claim as to personal taste? Is any
claim implied about some objective hierarchy of tastes written into
nature and detectable by every rational agent or by every cultivated
palate?
No doubt flavor preference is indeed the model for mere subjec-
tivity. This, however, is hardly under debate. The subjectivity of
taste and appetite and even of sports team loyalties need not be dis-
puted by anyone who doubts that the good is generally more subjec-
tive than the right. The idea of the good occurs in numerous con-
texts," not all of which are relevant to a comparison with the status
of justice or the right. We are most interested in the good in the
sense of living a good or flulfilling life, having a good character, be-
ing morally good, and such. Philosophers today do not battle over
whether there is really a best tasting flavor of ice cream on which
we sadly have yet not concurred. Instead, the dispute is over such
matters as the status of claims about good or fulfilling lives.
We could, after all, adopt a subjective sense of right to parallel
the subjectivity of goodness of taste. This subjective sense of the
right would be quite inconsequential. We might say, for example,
that chocolate is the right flavor to choose if one is looking for good
ice cream. This sense of right would be no more objective than
claims of goodness of taste. We are, however, more interested in
things like the goodness of lives. And here, it is possible to argue
that such claims can be no less objective than claims about justice
and rightness.
One need not, for example, adhere to some obsolete brand of
Aristotelianism to believe that some lives are objectively better than
some other lives. This need not involve elitism or paternalism-
quite the opposite. Which, for example, is more objectively true (or
false, for that matter): that a life of involuntary slavery, ending in-
voluntarily at age nineteen in wracking disease, frightened and
alone, and having accomplished nothing, is ordinarily not a good
life? Or a claim that the morally right or just thing to do in some
given case is to donate to one well-run charity but not the other?"
68. For a discussion of these contexts, see supra note 37.
69. Despite obvious deep disagreements about many matters of justice and
the right, it is still claimed that there is a stronger consensus on justice and the
right than about the good life. See, e.g., Sadurski, supra note 44, at 51 & n.28.
But cf Arneson, supra note 36, at 187 ("Why on earth suppose that beliefs
about the right will be any less controversial than beliefs about the good?"). See
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The former is a question of the good, and the latter a question of the
right. Yet the former seems reasonably answerable in a way the
latter is not. The right thing to do in the latter case is usually inde-
terminate in the sense of being objectively unanswerable. Let us
continue to think about justice and the right, but this time more
broadly. Do we really agree more about justice and the right, as on
matters of welfare reform, immigration, abortion, economic redistri-
bution, and affirmative action? These are important issues of jus-
tice. Someone might reply that issues of justice are by definition
controversial. But can we really say that there are fewer important
unresolved issues of justice and the right than of the good life?
No doubt there are many and diverse ways of achieving a good
life. ° The diversity of the good, however, does not tell us anything
about whether the good is subjective or objective. To see this, con-
sider a mathematical analogy. One might select from an infinite set
of numbers if one were, say, searching for examples of odd numbers.
One would thus have an enormous range of choice of odd numbers.
This would not, however, make the concept of an odd number into a
subjective one. Pluralism and diversity thus do not imply subjec-
tivity. There are many odd numbers to choose, but the oddness of
any given number is not a matter of the chooser's discretion. There
are also many and varied ways of effectively pursuing a good life. It
could be, and indeed is, objectively right or just for a society to pro-
mote those many and diverse expressions of the objective good,
given our differences in personal histories, cultures, abilities, inter-
ests, circumstances, and inclinations.
But the diversity of the good not only does not suggest that the
good is more subjective than the right, it does not even show, by it-
self, that we really disagree much about the good. Suppose A, B,
and C decide to become, respectively, a sailor, a musician, and a
surfer. Are any of them necessarily disagreeing with any of the oth-
ers, even if they all think that decisions about the good life are ob-
jective? Perhaps each simply feels that his or her talents and cir-
cumstances are unique. Each might feel that the other two have
made the objectively best choice in light of their own variant talents
and circumstances.
A moments reflection reminds us, though, that there is more to
the human good than nearly infinite diversity. A life of brain-
washing, pointless and resented torture, and deep and unchosen il-
lusion will tend to not be as good a life as other ways of being. Mar-
tha Nussbaum in particular has recently emphasized that not all
also Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV.
1733, 1734 (1995) (raising, without endorsing, the idea that "[plerhaps partici-
pants in a liberal democracy can agree on the right even if they disagree on the
good" (citing RAWLS, supra note 15, at 133-72)).
70. See, e.g., R. GEORGE WRIGHT, REASON AND OBLIGATION: A CONTEMI-
PORARY APPROACH TO LAW AND PoLImcAL MORALITY 99-106 (1994).
[Vol. 33
LEGAL THEORY
imaginable ways of living involve equal flourishing.7' In this, Pro-
fessor Nussbaum draws crucially on Aristotle, who focused centrally
on the human good and who is commonly interpreted as believing
the human good to be largely objective.72
Thus, the idea that the good is more subjective than the right or
the just again does not seem plausible. The very idea of genuine
charity cuts against a subjective view of human flourishing. Other-
wise, why not just cheaply re-educate the former recipients of char-
ity to enjoy truly their currently undesired circumstances? One
might object, however, that most of the arguments against the
greater subjectivity of the good have thus far been at a rather gen-
eral level. Do we reach the same conclusion if we narrow the focus
to more specific contrasts between the right and the good? We can
hardly contrast the right and the good in every specific context.
But, we can survey enough important contrasts to show that it is
implausible that the good is more subjective than the right.
What should be said, for example, about Justice Brennan's well-
known endorsement of pluralism in the California paternity rights
case of Michael H. v. Gerald D?73 Justice Brennan argued that
"[e]ven if we can agree... that 'family' and 'parenthood' are part of
the good life, it is absurd to assume that we can agree on the con-
tent of those terms and destructive to pretend that we do."74 Justice
Brennan seems clearly right in what he is actually saying here. All
he is clearly committing himself to is that we disagree about the
good, not that the good is subjective, or that the subjectivity of the
good is why we disagree. But since Justice Brennan does use the
71. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Aristotle on Human Nature and the
Foundations of Ethics, in WORLD, MIND, AND ETHICS 86 (J.E.J. Altham & Ross
Harrison eds., 1995); Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Functioning and Social
Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism, 20 POL. THEORY 202 (1992); see
also Martha Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, in LIBERALISM AND THE
GOOD 203 (R. Bruce Douglass et al. eds., 1990); Martha Nussbaum, Non-
Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 242 (Martha
Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993).
72. For an extensive discussion of Aristotelian ethics, see the various es-
says in ARISTOTLE AND MoRAL REALISM (Robert Heinaman ed., 1995). See also
GEORGIOS ANAGNOSTOPOULOS, ARISTOTLE ON THE GOALS AND EXACTNESS OF
ETHICS 65 (1994); TROELS ENGBERG-PEDERSEN, ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF MORAL
INSIGHT 261 (1983); FRED D. MILLER, JR., NATURE, JUSTICE, AND RIGHTS IN
ARISTOTLE'S PoLrrIcS 74 (1995); J. DONALD MONAN, MORAL KNOWLEDGE AND ITS
METHODOLOGY IN ARISTOTLE 60 (1968); Robert Bolton, Aristotle on the Objectiv-
ity of Ethics, in ESSAYS IN ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY IV: ARISTOTLE'S ETHIcs 7
(John P. Anton & Anthony Preus eds., 1991) ("Aristotle is traditionally re-
garded as a prime example of a philosopher who holds that ethical propositions
are objectively true or false."). But cf Bernard Yack, Natural Right and Aris-
totle's Understanding of Justice, 18 POL. THEORY 216 (1990) (rejecting the idea
that Aristotelian natural right involves a search for, or appeal to, natural or
"higher" standards ofjustice).
73. 491 U.S. 110, 136 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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word "idiosyncrasies" in referring to our own individual practices, 75
it hardly seems absurd to treat Justice Brennan as a subjectivist
regarding the good.
Justice Brennan is, in any event, here assuming at least a lack
of consensus on certain elements of the good life. Again, differences
in personal lifestyle choices do not necessarily imply real disagree-
ments among persons over lifestyle. But where we genuinely disa-
gree over matters of the good life, as we clearly do, we even more
clearly disagree over corresponding matters of justice and the right.
Could Justice Brennan plausibly argue that the good is subjective,
and that we disagree over it, but that the right and the just are
more objective, and that we have a clear consensus on such matters?
Hardly.
We have no objective guide to justice and the right that we lack
regarding the choice of a good life. Justice Brennan's argument, af-
ter all, is plainly not that we disagree over the good in the context of
paternal rights, and that political majorities and the law fairly re-
flect this. Instead, the point of seeking to establish justice and the
right by means of a federal constitutional right in this context is
precisely to override an elected legislature, perhaps reflecting ma-
jority sentiment, that does not recognize such a right." There is
disagreement as to the nature of the good life, but there is also disa-
greement over what justice and the right require in this context as
well.7 This disagreement about justice and the right obviously car-
ries over to the federal constitutional level. Justice Brennan's ar-
gument gives us no reason to believe that the good life is more sub-
jective than matters of right and justice.
What, though, about other specific distinctions between the
right and the good? Sometimes, for example, we try to distinguish
what it is right to do from the good in the form of what ought to be . 7
Can this contrast help us to see the good, or what ought to be, as
more subjective than the right, or what one ought to do? Again, no.
As one modern writer has put it, "[t]hat something is a good is, it-
self, some reason to seek it or to do something that will bring it
about."79 This is merely another way of intimately linking the right
and the good. As it happens, St. Thomas Aquinas is often accused
of triviality in holding that the good is to be done and pursued, and
that evil is to be avoided.80 This may, in a sense, be empty advice.
75. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONsTITUTIoNAL LAW 44 (3d ed.1996) (discussing the counter majoritarian function of constitutional rights).77. Justice Brennan himself, for example, was able to attract only two
other Justices to his view of the scope of the right involved. Michael H., 491U.S. at 136 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This shows no more, but also no less,
than the controversiality of the right.
78. See, e.g., Pybus, supra note 10, at 26.
79. Stocker, supra note 24, at 91.
80. See Pybus, supra note 10, at 26.
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But the inherent inseparability of the right and the good that Aqui-
nas also points to here is hardly trivial, especially in suggesting
that the right and the good do not operate at different levels of ob-
jectivity. It is instead a point of great significance for the law.
How about when we judge a person's character? Here again,
the right and the good operate at similar levels. Suppose someone
asks why we consider a particular person to be of good character.
Why couldn't we reply in part that she is a just person, or is some-
one with a just character 81-where justice again falls on the side of
the right?82 Would anyone suppose that when we make character
judgments of good and bad, we are thinking in subjective terms, but
that when we explain our character assessment, and refer to justice
as a character trait, we are thinking in more objective terms?
Or let us test the difference between doing the right thing, and
the motive from which we act, where the motive is assumed to be
good or bad.83 Let us take the clearest case we can find of an objec-
tively wrong thing to do: a forcible rape. If anything is still thought
to be objectively wrong, this will be it. But even here, must we say
that the motivation or intent underlying the act is less objectively
bad? Suppose, as seems likely enough, that the conscious motive of
the rape was to subordinate or humiliate the victim. Do we want to
say that the badness of this motive is just a matter of taste, or is
merely relative to group preference?' Even if we assumed that such
a motive did not have to be conscious, or otherwise as vile, would
that make the moral character of the motive underlying the rape
more subjective?
Couldn't it be argued that in an era of legal and political plu-
ralism, there will often be more of a consensus that someone is of a
good or of a treacherous or cowardly character than that the policy
or decision she favors is the right or just one? Is there not a
greater consensus as to the quality of character of Richard Nixon
and of Gandhi than on who was more nearly right on political, mili-
tary, or diplomatic doctrine? Sometimes, when we seem to impugn
the character of political antagonists, we are really not criticizing
their character so much as their failure to see how their actions or
political beliefs lead to wrong decisions, or to bad outcomes, despite
their good intentions. This failure on their part may, but need not,
itself reflect badness of character.
81. See SIDGWICK, supra note 21, at 4.
82. For a discussion of the link between justice and the right, see supra
note 10 and accompanying text.
83. See Ross, supra note 24, at 6-7, 156.
84. For a discussion of the risks associated with group subjectivism, see in-
fra Part IV.
85. For a related general discussion, see John A. Oesterle, Morally Good
and Morally Right, 54 MONIST 31, 31 (1970).
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III. THIN MEANINGS AND THICKASSOCIATIONS: RONALD DwORKIN
ON THE LEGAL REGULATION OF EUTHANASIA
Professor Ronald Dworkin is a preeminent legal philosopher of
our time.86 Yet it is not much of an exaggeration to say that one of
the most interesting and obvious things about his recent work is the
deflated way in which he uses standard terminology. Consider, for
a moment, how the idea of the sacred, of the inviolable, of sanctity,
or of the objective are typically used. Some of us, of course, have no
use for some or all of these ideas. We may consider them danger-
ous, misguided, or obsolete. Professor Dworkin, however, relies ex-
plicitly on them all-but in rather evacuated senses. This may be
partly a matter of his simply not believing in or valuing any
stronger sense of the terms. But this may also reflect an uncon-
scious ambivalence and an unconscious unwillingness to break
completely with ideas that no longer inspire full confidence. Profes-
sor Dworkin's use of these terms is certainly clear, honest, fair, and
consistent. Yet typically, there is an inevitable echoing of and im-
plicit reliance on prior, broader meanings and associations. The
ghosts of the traditional meanings of the terms must do some of the
argumentative work for Dworkin.
The point is not that Professor Dworkin is unique in this curi-
ous "objective" ambivalence. He is not. Many persons believe, for
example, that the world may be ultimately void of real meaning,
even as they continue to adhere to the remnants of some traditional
belief in intrinsic human dignity.87 Professor Dworkin's work is an
unusually sophisticated example of the pull of an ambivalence and a
split of personality more or less consciously felt by many.88
86. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 75 (1997) (referring to Dworkin as
"the emblematic modern American legal theorist"); Brian Leiter, Is There an
"American' Jurisprudence?, 17 OxFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 367, 369 (1997)
(describing Ronald Dworkin as "unquestionably the most influential living legal
philosopher in the English-speaking world"); Edward J. McCaffery, Ronald
Dworkin, Inside-Out, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1043, 1043 (1997) (describing Dworkin as
"the preeminent Anglo-American legal philosopher of our time and, quite possi-
bly, of any time"); Richard A. Posner, Conceptions of Legal "Theory": A Reply to
Ronald Dworkin, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 377, 384 n.24 (1997) (describing Dworkin as
"our leading living philosopher of law").
87. See Michael J. Perry, The Gospel According to Dworkin, 11 CONST.
COMMENTARY 163, 181 (1994) ("How do we get from 'the universe is (or might
be) nothing but a cosmic process bereft of ultimate meaning' to 'every human
being is nonetheless sacred (in the strong or objective sense)'?").
88. For another sophisticated and indeed poignant example, see Larmore,
supra note 20, at 29-30 (1990) (arguing that if our "deepest," most unshakable
convictions are ultimately justifiable by nothing beyond our own particular
"way of life," this may amount to an ultimately inadequate approach to impera-
tive morality). Cf Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Die, 106 YALE L.J. 1123, 1145
(1997) (referring to "a culture in which life is seen with a degree of reverence").
Feeling "a degree of reverence" toward the life of, say, the irreversibly comatose
may be a curious use of language, but it probably reflects many persons' actual
compromised or conflicting feelings.
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For many, the ideas of sanctity, of the sacred, or of the inviola-
ble evoke something like, at a very minimum, prohibition or re-
quirement. For Dworkin, however, the inviolable is merely pre-
sumptive, prima facie, and defeasible in its remarkably attenuated
"inviolability." Sanctity, the sacred, and the inviolable can,
Dworkin argues, be "outweighed by other factors."89 Dworkin be-
lieves these considerations always have "positive weight, but can be
overridden."" In particular, Dworkin concludes that "both sides in
the debate about euthanasia share a concern for life's sanctity; they
are united by that value, and disagree only about how best to inter-
pret and respect it."91 More ordinarily, prima facie inviolability
would be a contradiction in terms. Given this disagreement about
the meaning of inviolability, though, Dworkin concludes that gov-
ernments may encourage persons to take questions of euthanasia
seriously, but must not legally impose any particular view of the
sanctity or inviolability of life beyond respecting such rights as may
be relevant.92 The point is of course not whether Dworkin is right or
89. Frances M. Kamm, Abortion and the Value of Life: A Discussion of
Life's Dominion, 95 COLmhi. L. REv. 160, 164 (1994). Thus, inviolability can
mean violability. See Richard Stith, On Death and Dworkin: A Critique of His
Theory of Inviolability, 56 MD. L. REV. 289, 313 (1997).
90. Kamm, supra note 89, at 164.
91. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE's DOMIION 238 (1993).
92. See Stith, supra note 89, at 314; see also Amicus Curiae Brief for Ron-
ald Dworkin et al. at 19, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (No.
95-1858) ("[Alny paternalistic justification for an absolute prohibition of assis-
tance to such (terminally ill] patients would of necessity appeal to a widely con-
tested religious or ethical conviction many of them, including the patient-
plaintiffs, reject."). Of course, any legal response to the issue of euthanasia
must, ultimately, rely on one or more contested principles, at least at the level
of rights or liberties, or some other sort of value. Dworkin makes a number of
interesting arguments in this context. An element of our life is said, for exam-
ple, to be of value only if it is endorsed or accepted by us. See T.M. Wilkinson,
Dworkin on Paternalism and Well-Being, 16 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 433, 434
(1996). Thus gifts or abilities we wish we did not have cannot be of value as an
element in our life. As well, "[n]one of us wants to end our lives out of charac-
ter." DWORKIN, supra note 91, at 213. This would rule out any number of dra-
matic, quite reasonable, or quite heroic ways of bringing one's life to a close.
Dworkin is arguing, in effect, not just for integrity but for plodding predictabil-
ity in one's death as well. See also Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2308 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (urging "proper recognition to the individual's interest in choosing a
final chapter that accords with her life story" (citing DWORKIN, supra note 91, at
213)); Eric Rakowski, The Sanctity of Human Life, 103 YALE L.J. 2049, 2095
(1994) (quoting DWORKIN, supra note 91). Finally, end-of-life decisions should
"be made out of our basic responsibility to ourselves." Ronald Dworkin, Eutha-
nasia, Morality, and the Law, Remarks at the Fifth Annual Fritz B. Burns Lec-
ture at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law School (Nov. 22, 1996), in 30 LOYOLA
(L.A.) L. REV. 1465, 1491 (1997). But why does Professor Dworkin believe that
we all have a basic responsibility to ourselves? Where does this basic responsi-
bility come from? All of these claims and asserted rights are of course easily
contestable; the trick is to figure out when contestability disqualifies a legal
system from relying on a belief and when it does not.
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wrong in whatever position he takes on euthanasia. Rather, it is to
notice the odd duality of Dworkin's narrow definitions and the broad
lingering associations of his chosen terms.
On the idea of the objectivity of any moral principles, it is fair to
say that Professor Dworkin's approach is complex. He concludes his
most extensive recent discussion of the issue by declaring that some
moral beliefs are true or objective, and that to claim otherwise is
"false, just bad philosophy." 3 Referring to the idea that there can
be some "real" right answers to moral questions, Dworkin proclaims
that "[m]y realism ... knows no bounds."94 Thus Dworkin seems for
a moment to embrace the traditional understanding of moral objec-
tivity.
It turns out, however, that Professor Dworkin's use of terms
like "objectivity," "moral realism," and "moral truth" parallels his
use of terms like "inviolable," "sacred," and "sanctity." Dworkin
does not claim to be a moral objectivist in even roughly the same
sense in which Plato and Aristotle, for example, were moral objec-
tivists. 5 He declares that he "would not volunteer the more baroque
formulations of that view, about timeless truths among the furni-
ture of the universe. But if pressed I would insist that, so far as
they mean anything at all, they are true.""
. The latter formulation may suggest both a wariness of, and an
inclination to embrace, moral objectivism. Perhaps Dworkin is ac-
tually of a divided mind in this respect. But it becomes clear
enough that Dworkin does not embrace any standard objectivism.
His reference to the "furniture of the universe" may seem to suggest
that Dworkin rejects only extremely ambitious, heavily metaphysi-
cal forms of objectivism, while accepting other less extremist meta-
physical formulae.97 As it turns out, though, almost all metaphysics
93. Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, 25 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 87, 139 (1996). For an equivocal expression of a roughly similar
perspective, see THOMAS NAGEL, THE LAST WORD 103 (1997).
Although it is less clear than in some of the other areas.. ., attempts
to get entirely outside of the object language of... good and bad, right
and wrong, and to see all such judgments as expressions of a contin-
gent, nonobjective perspective will eventually collapse before the in-
dependent force of the first-order judgments themselves.
Id. This line of analysis assumes, dubiously, that we can determine the real,
rational force of an argument before we decide whether it is merely subjective
or not.
94. Dworkin, supra note 93, at 128; see also Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of
Theory, 29 ARIz. ST. L.J. 353, 361-63 (1997) (arguing for the proposition, among
others, that there is no significant difference between calling a practice unjust
and calling that practice objectively unjust).
95. See sources cited supra note 72. Dworkin points out that one can reject
any ambitious metaphysical claims, and still offer reasons for one's moral be-
liefs, e.g., that promise-breaking causes disruption, pain, or distrust, whether
people recognize or admit this or not.
96. Dworkin, supra note 93, at 128.
97. Id.
[Vol. 33402
LEGAL THEORY
is classed by Dworkin along with the metaphor of the "furniture of
the universe." 8 Almost all metaphysics turns out to be "baroque"
and unacceptable. Dworkin can classify himself as an objectivist-
even as a strong objectivist--only because, in his view, no more am-
bitious version of objectivism than his own nonmetaphysical, at-
tenuated version is meaningful and plausible.99 Why not call one-
self a moral objectivist if one is as much of a moral objectivist as it is
meaningful to be?'
The overall impression of Dworkin's use of this terminology
might, one supposes, be one of his moderation in avoiding excessive
enthusiasm for speculative metaphysics on the one hand, and ex-
cessive skepticism on the other. The lasting impression, however, is
not really one of moderation. Instead, one senses that Professor
Dworkin is moving, or being pulled, in two opposing directions. T1 ' At
98. Id.
99. See id. at 139; see also Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Coherentism, 50
SMU L. REv. 1679, 1699 (1997) (discussing Dworkin's adoption of the label"moral realism").
100. Thus, we would not say, for example, that we do not really believe in
the existence of Australia merely because someone might claim that there is
some deeper sense of belief of which we are not capable, or which we find inco-
herent. But by extension, even the most hard-boiled of us could, in Dworkin's
view, be "unicornists," if we believe in unicorns to the fullest extent that it
makes sense to believe in unicorns, which is presumably not much. To call a
skeptical scientist a "believer in unicorns" based on this logic seems rather
misleading.
101. For some sense of this, see Kress, supra note 49 (reviewing DENNIS
PATTERSON, LAw AND TRUTH (1996)) ("Dworkin is also infamous for simultane-
ously maintaining some form of modest objectivity. . while attempting to
squirm out of any metaphysical commitments."). Some have attempted tominimize or resolve this ambivalence in Dworkin's thought. One commentator,
for example, has argued that
Dworkin is ... a moralist who has clung to the thesis that there can
be "right answers" even and, indeed, especially, in hard cases. This
leads many to conclude that Dworkin is a closet moral objectivist, a
believer in natural law, notwithstanding his frequent disclaimer of
any personal belief in ghostly specters of abstract rights.
The apparent contradiction between an anti-foundational, skepti-
cal method and the optimistic, nonskeptical arguments made out
within the method dissolves when we see Dworkin's nonskepticism as
an act of political will.
McCaffery, supra note 86, at 1059. Despite such resolutions, one is still more
struck by the dualities and objective ambivalences in Dworkin's thought than
by its unity of spirit. Dworkin, ultimately, is not a "closet moral objectivist."
Id. However, he urges us, with occasional passion, to believe in moral objectiv-
ism. See Dworkin, supra note 93, at 139. At the end of the day, both accepting
and rejecting moral objectivity suggests a certain duality of mind.
Perhaps we should see Dworkin as pulled toward skepticism, but as re-
sisting, not because the most rationally cogent case favors objectivity, but sim-
ply "as an act of political will." McCaffery, supra note 86, at 1059. One prob-
lem is that one's political will to believe in moral objectivity cannot itself be
logically justified on any morally objective grounds. That would be question-
begging. Someone in Dworkin's position can will himself to believe in moral
1998] 403
WAKE FOREST LAWREVIEW
a very minimum, Dworkin wants to systematically retain a crucial
vocabulary-the standard meanings of which he can no longer en-
dorse. In matters of metaphysics, his positions do not differ cru-
cially from some of the nonobjectivists from which he seeks to dis-
tinguish himself.
Dworkin's discussion of euthanasia and assisted suicide in par-
ticular would ultimately gain from aspiring to some genuinely objec-
tively better and worse answers. We must not confuse the genu-
inely objective value of individual liberty, autonomy, or dignity with
subjective, ultimately arbitrary preferences regarding the manner
of one's own life or death. An arbitrary, subjective preference re-
garding even one's own death may require no more respect, all else
being equal, than an equally intense personal preference regarding
flavor of ice cream. A person's preference regarding manner of
death deserves serious respect in proportion to its linkage, in one
way or another, to individual freedom, autonomy, dignity, and other
considerations we will here assume to be objective matters.
This is, of course, not to suggest that the law should typically
override even merely subjective, arbitrary personal preferences.
There are many moral and practical reasons not to take this course.
Even trying to require everyone to eat the same ice cream or root for
an assigned team would likely be a disaster. But the strongest case
against legally interfering with the choices people make regarding
their own death draws crucially on considerations with an objective
weight and character, whether we call them matters of the good life
or--quite inseparably--of justice and the right. Some of the crucial
costs of consistently backing away from aspiring to moral objectivity
will be further explored below.
IV. THE SPLIT LEGAL PERSONALITY MEETS MR. HYDE: THE HIGH
COST OF GROUP SUBJECTIVISM
The project of trying to have the best of both worlds through an
objective approach to the right and a subjective approach to the
good has by now collapsed. The right and the good simply cannot be
separated in such a way as to make this possible. So why not move
on to the popular and more consistent position of across-the-board
subjectivism, in our broad sense of the term? The inseparability of
objectivity in the expectation of some political payoff, but the value of that pay-
off cannot yet be claimed to be real or objective. So why, in the absence of any
morally objective reasons to do so, embrace one political stance rather than an-
other? One's grounds for choosing one set of political principles would have to
be arbitrary at that point. If one's political stance at least partially precedes
one's (willed) endorsement of moral objectivity, why not start from a premise of
enlightened self-interest, rather than some set of more egalitarian premises?
Why not adapt to the wishes of the powerful, or those who can dole out benefits
and punishments? Why sacrifice unnecessarily, in the absence of any presently
objectively binding reason to do so?
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the right and the good would pose no real problems if the right and
the good are equally subjective.
Believing that the right and the good are both subjective, in our
broad sense, certainly avoids a number of problems. We have al-
ready seen the popularity of the various forms of subjectivism
among persons who think about such things."2 After a serious
cross-examination, however, few of us would be happy with a thor-
ough, consistent subjectivism. This is, of course, a complex matter
with many angles.103 One quick way to cast doubt on consistent
subjectivism, though, is to focus on how subjectivism in practice
handles the question of rape in general and date rape in particular.
Let us start by asking how the law and the broader society
think about rape. When we say that rape is wrong, or that some act
should or does count as a rape, what are we really saying? Is this a
matter where at least something can be said about right and wrong,
justice and injustice, that is really, objectively sounder than some
alternative view? Or is what we say about rape ultimately an arbi-
trary social construct, with the norms and standards to be applied
rising no higher than those of the relevant groups with which we
identify?
Often, we talk about rape in terms that seem at least to aspire
to objectivity. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court case of
Coker v. Georgia,"' in which the Court rejected the death penalty
for the rape of an adult victim on Eighth Amendment grounds. In
Coker, Justice White, for the plurality, cautioned that:
We do not discount the seriousness of rape as a crime. It is
highly reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost
total contempt for the personal integrity and autonomy0 5 of
102. For a discussion of these camps of subjectivism, see supra notes 50-56
and accompanying text.
103. For a brief discussion of one view, see, for example, WRiGHT, supra note
70, at 5.
104. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
105. For a discussion of sexual autonomy in the context of rape, see, for ex-
ample, Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape Law
and Beyond, 11 L. & PHL. 35 (1992). It is not clear how much any autonomy
theory explains popular attitudes toward rape, or the law of rape. It is, for ex-
ample, possible to rape persons who are too young to display much autonomy of
any sort, who are congenitally unable to display much autonomy, or who are
now permanently unable to display much autonomy because of some disease or
disability. See Deborah W. Denno, Sexuality, Rape, and Mental Retardation,
1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 315. Does the moral gravity of the rape, all else being
equal, track the degree to which the victim at one time had, might develop, or
might but for the rape have developed a capacity for autonomy? Note in par-
ticular that the rape of a child is sometimes considered worse than the rape of a
typically more autonomous adult. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063,
1066 (La. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Bethley v. Louisiana, 117 S. Ct. 2425
(1997).
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the female victim and for the latter's privilege ' °6 of choosing
those with whom intimate relationships are to be established.
Short of homicide, it is the "ultimate violation of the self." '
It is possible to say all this, but to mean it only in a merely subjec-
tive or group-relative sense. But that is not, in context, the natural
reading here. Justice White is not trying merely to articulate some
community code. At the very least, we can assume that Justice
White would not have said all this, meaning it only in some subjec-
tive sense, unless he had hoped as well to borow some of the rhe-
torical force that identical language, intended as objective truth,
might carry.
We do not, however, always talk about rape-either its scope or
its moral character-in language that so evidently makes claims to
moral objectivity. Often, we think of the scope or severity of rape in
terms that seem to rise no higher than our group identifications,
group affiliations, and group interests. Let us briefly explore this
group relativism regarding rape, and then decide whether it is an
encouraging, progressive development.
As a culture, we have collectively a split personality with regard
to the scope or definition of rape. Sometimes, this is referred to in
the language not of a collectively split personality, but of a paradox.
It has thus been observed that:
An apparent paradox exists among American young people
with regard to rape. On the one hand, rape is consensually
viewed as an abhorrent form of interpersonal violence. On the
other hand, many young people do not believe that forced sex
between acquaintances and intimates is particularly wrong or
problematic and they do not think that there is such a thing as
rape between acquaintances and intimates.' °8
In the latter view, acquaintance rape is not real rape. This view is
held not just by many young and nonyoung persons, but commonly
by official representatives of the legal system.0 9
106. It is unclear why Justice White's opinion here adopts the language of
privilege rather than of right. A legal or moral right does not descend to the
level of a privilege merely because the right is feloniously violated.
107. 433 U.S. at 597 (footnotes added) (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE LAW
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN., RAPE AND ITS VIcTIms: A REPORT FOR
CITIZENS, HEALTHFACILITIES, AND CRIMNAL JUSTICE AGENCIES 1 (1975)). For an
argument to the contrary-that rape is a serious crime, but not a very serious
crime (perhaps comparable in gravity to a severe beating)-see Michael Davis,
Setting Penalties: What Does Rape Deserve?, 3 L. & PHIL. 61, 62-63, 78 (1984).
108. Jacquelyn W. White & John A. Humphrey, Young People's Attitudes
Toward Acquaintance Rape, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN CRIME 43, 43
(Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer eds., 1991).
109. See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1092 (1986).
Where less force is used or no other physical injury is inflicted, where
threats are inarticulate, where the two know each other, where the
setting is not an alley but a bedroom, where the initial contact was
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Rape is thus not simply an act of conscious trangressivism or
rare mental illness."0 Rape is instead often either excused or de-
fined out of existence, in some contexts, by particular mainstream
segments or groups. Some groups, certainly, define rape broadly
and condemn it strenuously. Others, however, simply do not. Par-
ticular groups, however constituted, thus think of rape in dramati-
cally different ways.
The roughest way to construct a group-relativist or a subjectiv-
ist understanding of rape would be simply to distinguish crudely be-
tween stereotypical men and women. Men would have certain in-
terests, and therefore certain group-based understandings of rape,
and women would have largely different interests, and therefore
other group-based understandings of rape. Each group might, to
varying degrees, be able to point out inconsistencies in the other's
view. But it would, in a subjectivist view, be absurd to say that ei-
ther view was "really" better or nearer "the truth" than the other.
These stereotypic men and women would instead simply have dif-
ferent, perhaps incommensurable, value schemes.
Does this disturbing picture bear any relation to reality? A
crude gender-group breakdown of course grossly oversimplifies mat-
ters. But to some degree, it reflects current social reality for many
persons. The social science evidence suggests, for example, that
many men and women tend to interpret differently the meaning of
dating behavior and other social behavior."' What women may per-
ceive as friendliness, men tend more to perceive as sexual inter-
est."2 Men tend to discern sexual invitation where women do not."'
Men see more behaviors as still permissible after a verbal refusal of
not a kidnapping but a date, where the woman says no but does not
fight,. . . the law. . . often tell[s] us that no crime has taken
place ....
Id.
110. See Tanja H. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 278 Cal. Rptr. 918, 924
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991) ("'[T]he locus of violence against women rests squarely in
the middle of what our culture defines as "normal" interaction between men
and women.'") (quoting Allan Griswold Johnson, On the Prevelance of Rape in
the United States, 6 SIGNS 136, 146 (1980)); Laurie Bechhofer & Andrea Parrot,
What Is Acquaintance Rape?, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN CRIE 9, 20
(Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer eds., 1991).
111. See WHITE & HUMPHREY, supra note 108, at 52 ("[Yloung women and
men frequently perceive the same dating circumstances differently."); VERNON
R. WIEHE & ANN L. RIcHARDs, INTIMATE BETRAYAL: UNDERSTANDING AND
RESPONDING TO THE TRAUiA OF ACQUAINTANCE RAPE 78 (1995) ("[Mien tend to
view the world from a more sexual perspective than do women.").
112. See WIEHE & RICHARDS, supra note 111, at 78.
113. See ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE 41-42 (1988).
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consent than women do.14 When date rape occurs, young men are
more inclined than women to blame the rape victim."5
These differences do not amount to merely a harmless relativ-
ism. Depending on the degree of bluntness with which the question
is posed, substantial percentages of young men admit to some like-
lihood that they would perpetrate what would amount to a rape if
they could be assured of not being caught or prosecuted."6 Signifi-
cant numbers of young persons believe that it is appropriate to im-
pose sex forcibly on a woman under various common circumstances,
including a long-term dating relationship or when spending "a lot of
money" on the woman."'
These striking beliefs about rape are not confined to males. To
at least some limited degree, young women may subscribe to similar
beliefs."' Such beliefs may be contrary to the obvious interests of
women, but it is hardly unprecedented for particular groups to in-
ternalize norms that undermine their own interests. Young men
and women in our culture are often not sexually segregated for so-
cialization purposes, and they may to some extent influence one an-
other's norms and beliefs. Beliefs about rape for one or both groups
seem, however, to be associated with factors such as the degree of
hostility borne toward women.. and a view of male-female relation-
114. See Bechhofer & Parrot, supra note 110, at 22.
115. See WARSHAW, supra note 113, at 42-43; Patrick J. Harrison et al., Date
and Acquaintance Rape: Perceptions and Attitude Change Strategies, 32 J.C.
STUDENT DEV. 131, 138 (1991).
116. See Charlene L. Mueblenhard et al., Definitions of Rape: Scientific and
Political Implications, 48 J. Soc. IssuEs 23, 39-40 (1992); White & Humphrey,
supra note 108, at 48 (pointing out "that about 35% of male college students re-
ported some willingness to rape if they were assured of not getting caught").
117. Bechhofer & Parrot, supra note 110, at 22.
118. See id.; see also Roseann Hannon et al., College Students' Judgments
Regarding Sexual Aggression During a Date, 35 SEx ROLES 765, 766 (1996)
(discussing study where only 52.2% of the participants identified intercourse
combined with both physical and verbal resistance as rape); Barbara E. John-
son et al., Rape Myth Acceptance and Sociodemographic Characteristics: A Mul-
tidimensional Analysis, 36 SEx ROLEs 693, 706 (1997) (concluding that "[mIales
and those upholding traditional gender role beliefs were more likely to accept
certain myths that blame the woman"); Beverly A. Kopper, Gender, Gender
Identity, Rape Myth Acceptance, and Time of Initial Resistance on the Perception
of Acquaintance Rape Blame and Avoidability, 34 SEx RoLEs 81, 90-91 (1996)
(concluding victims of acquaintance rape are likely to blame themselves); White
& Humphrey, supra note 108, at 47 (citing a large study of 11-14 year olds in
which "31% of the boys and 32% of the girls said it is not improper for a man to
rape a woman who had past sexual experiences" and "65% of the boys and 47%
of all of these seventh-to-ninth graders said it is OK for a man to rape a woman
he has been dating for more than six months").
119. See Bruce McCollaum & David Lester, Sexual Aggression and Attitudes
Toward Women and Mothers, 137 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 538, 539 (1997) (concluding
respondents' sexual aggressiveness was "associated with participants' negative
attitudes toward their own mothers and toward women in general").
[Vol. 33408
ships as basically manipulative or adversarial.2 ' This group adver-
sarialism, in which men and women are assumed to be "opaque to
the other's understanding," 121 is the most obvious form of group-
relativism regarding rape.
It is certainly possible to say that selecting these crude, rather
ad hoc belief groups, cutting across gender lines as they do, does not
fairly test the ability of group relativism or other forms of subjec-
tivism to address rape issues. We can admit that the problems of
rape would be reduced if the world were constituted solely by, to
choose from myriad possibilities, Gandhians and de Beauvoirians.
If everyone fell into one of these two camps, and long retained the
substantive norms and views of their namesakes while still being
group relativists, group relativism would have much appeal. These
hypothetical groupings of consistent relativists, however, do not
match actual belief groups regarding date rape. This is not to claim
that switching away from a belief that rape can be wrong only for
group-relative reasons toward a belief in the real wrongness and
breadth of rape would quickly transform social life. But such a
switch seems a necessary part of any real progress.
Surely the most appealing approach would be a mutual aban-
donment of group relativism in favor of pursuing mutual under-
standing and genuine communication. Genuine communication is
surely best understood in objective terms, as opposed to "genuine"
communication according to the standards of only one group, but
not the other.'23 And genuine communication is valuable, at least in
120. See Martha R. Burt, Cultural Myths and Supports for Rape, 38 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 217, 218, 229 (1980). For Burt,
[adversarial sexual beliefs refers to the expectation that sexual rela-
tionships are fundamentally exploitative, that each party to them is
manipulative, sly, cheating, opaque to the other's understanding, and
not to be trusted. To a person who holds this view of male and female
sexuality, rape might seem the extreme on a continuum of exploita-
tion, but not an unexpected or horrifying occurrence, or one justifying
sympathy or support.
Id. at 218 (emphasis added). For further reference to Burt's study, see, for ex-
ample, LARRY BARON & MURRAY A. STRAUS, FOUR THEORIES OF RAPE IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY: A STATE-LEVEL ANALYSIS 6 (1989); Patricia L.N. Donat &
John D'Emilio, A Feminist Redefinition of Rape and Sexual Assault: Historical
Foundations and Change, 48 J. Soc. ISSUES 9, 17 (1992).
121. Burt, supra note 110, at 218.
122. See Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, 8 L. & PHIL. 217, 236,
240 (1989); see also Maya Manian, Rethinking Rape, 20 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J.
333 (1997) (reviewing DATE RAPE: FEMINISM, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE LAW (Leslie
Francis ed., 1996)); Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, in DATE RAPE:
FEMINISM, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE LAw 1 (Leslie Francis ed., 1996).
123. Much of the work by Jfirgen Habermas can be described as using the
idea of genuine communication to reach agreement on basic norms that at least
minimally transcend mere group preference or group interests. See, e.g.,
JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992).
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part, for objective reasons, and not merely because a group with
which one happens to identify happens to value it.
The mentality of group-relative norms has thus manifested it-
self quite unappealingly in the context of rape. There are, however,
more appealing, more objectivist alternatives. Consider, for exam-
ple, the vision of Martha Burt:
Only by promoting the idea of sex as a mutually undertaken,
freely chosen, fully conscious interaction, in contradistinction
to the too often held view that it is a battlefield in which each
side tries to exploit the other while avoiding exploitation in
turn, can society create an atmosphere free of the threat of
rape.
Surely we would want to see this as genuinely worth striving for,
rather than as merely the vision of some group with which we might
or might not identify.'
CONCLUSION
We have identified and explored some of the most important
dimensions of what we have diagnosed as the split legal personality.
As it turns out, these three aspects of our split legal personality all
have understandable motivations. We can appreciate why the vari-
ous splits developed. But we have also recognized that these dual-
isms are untenable and ultimately unappealing. At work in all
three of these unfortunate splits is an unduly severe distrust of the
idea that some legal and moral principles can be genuinely better
than others, an idea that is increasingly rejected in sophisticated
ways. It is, admittedly, easy to distrust or reject the very idea of
any objective truth given its history of abuse. As it happens,
124. Burt, supra note 110, at 229.
125. This is of course not to argue that distinctive group perspectives cannot
contribute to an overall understanding of rape. Quite the opposite. It is hardly
an exaggeration to say that our best overall understanding is usually an accre-
tion and synthesis of distinctive group perspectives. People think and perceive,
typically, within various narrow and broad group perspectives. This is not to
suggest, however, that every claim about rape and its morality that can be
linked to some group's perspective is equally valid and equally worthy of em-
bodiment in the law. See People v. Rhines, 182 Cal. Rptr. 478, 484 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1982) (finding that "[t]o allow a race or any group to set up for itself stan-
dards of conduct and reasonableness to apply to nonconsenting individuals in
the context of rape is a concept that is unthinkable in our society"); see also
State v. Lee, 494 N.W.2d 475, 480 (Minn. 1992) (noting that "the clear purpose
of the testimony of defendant's expert was to convey the impression that in the
Hmong community the complaints by A and B were not considered credible be-
cause Hmong women who have been raped do not act, post-rape, as these com-
plainants did"); State v. Her, 510 N.W.2d 218, 221 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994)
(noting that "[tlhe apparent differences between Hmong and American cultures
in their treatment of rape, adultery, and female sexuality were a major element
of the trial").
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though, this distrust and rejection of objectivity is itself a genuinely
bad idea. Abuse of the idea of objectivity can be reduced. In prac-
tice, rejecting the aspiration to objectivity neither promotes per-
sonal autonomy nor serves the interests of groups chronically vic-
timized by others. The oppressed have, almost by definition, the
greatest need and the best reason to appeal to objective truth.

